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The Case of the Gospels:
Memory’s Desire and the Limits of Historical Criticism
Werner H. Kelber
In der Erinnerung wird Vergangenheit rekonstruiert.1
     (J. Assmann 1992:31)
Memory and remembering are presently much in vogue in humanistic and
social science discourse.  We are experiencing the revival of a topos that
played a principal role throughout antiquity and the Middle Ages both in the
orally and scribally processed formations of thought.  In our time a rapidly
growing body of disciplinary and interdisciplinary studies seeks to trace and
reconstruct multiple forms and processes of remembering and forgetting,
past and present.  For example, renewed attention is being paid to ancient
and medieval practices of visually processed forms of remembering.
Conceivably, insight into a mnemonic craft of thought that stored much that
was considered worthy of remembering in iconic style may cast an
illuminating light on our present media situation, which—in part at least—is
characterized by an extreme inundation of images.
In what has become a classic, Frances Yates (1966) surveyed the
ancient and medieval art of mnemotechnique—ranging from memory as a
set of waxed tablets to an architectural design functioning as storehouse or
inventory—and produced in effect a handbook on ancient Western memorial
commonplaces.  Yates deserves credit for having raised awareness about the
cognitive role of a visually based memory, recognition of which since the
eighteenth century had receded into oblivion.  Some of her subsequent
publications created the unsupportable impression that iconic conventions
and techniques of memorization were cultivated in predominantly esoteric
circles (1972, 1979, 1982).  However, recent contributions by Mary
Carruthers (1990, 1998) and Janet Coleman (1992) have expanded the scope
of Yates’ work and corrected the one-sided hermetic predisposition.
                                          
1 “In remembering the past we reconstruct it.”
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Carruthers’ Book of Memory (1990) may be described as a study of
the nature and activities of medieval thought, including practices of
composing and reading texts, appropriating pictures, envisioning words and
events, “eating” and “digesting” words, and modes of meditation and prayer.
She has unfolded a culture extending from late antiquity into the
Renaissance in which thought was deeply rooted in the human sensorium of
touching, smelling, hearing, and varying forms of visualization.  Her work
suggests, by implication more than by definitional explicitness, that some of
our central Western metaphors did not mean what they have come to mean
to us today.  Among those concepts we had thought we knew, but which
require rethinking in ancient and medieval terms, are text and textuality,
author and tradition, reading and writing, and logic and cognition, to name
but a few.  Most importantly, Carruthers arrives at the conclusion that the
culture of late antiquity and the Middle Ages—notwithstanding its steadily
increasing manufacture of manuscripts—was predominantly a memorial
culture rather than a purely documentary, textual one.  Coleman’s Ancient
and Medieval Memories (1992) distinguishes itself by a superior knowledge
of ancient philosophy and medieval theology, and by uncommonly subtle
representations of philosophical argumentation.  Her hugely impressive
inventory of ancient and medieval theories of memory, which encompasses
almost 2000 years of Western intellectual history, principally makes the
argument that the measure of remembering was not historical verification as
such, but rhetorical persuasiveness.  One was inclined to remember
primarily what was deemed worthy of remembering, and what merited
remembering depended on the bearing it had for present time and
circumstances.  Only with the advent of the Enlightenment, she claims, were
concerted efforts made to reconstruct the past as past.
Since the 1980s an interdisciplinary group of scholars under the
leadership of Jan Assmann (1992) and Aleida Assmann (1999) has produced
a steadily growing body of work that carries on the legacy of the pioneering
work on memory by Maurice Halbwachs (1925, 1941, 1992, 1997).
Memory is here entirely allied with the group and with group identity—a
concept that will prove pertinent to the case of the gospels.  Once again, the
process of remembering does not work purely for the benefit of what is
deemed worthy of recollecting; that is to say, it is not primarily fed by needs
for preservation of the past in a state of authenticity.  Rather, memory selects
and modifies subjects and figures of the past in order to make them
serviceable to the image the community wishes to cultivate of itself.
Socialization and memory mutually condition each other, seeking in the last
analysis preservation not of the remembered past but of group identity.  The
emphasis is decidedly on the sociological dimension of memory.
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This concept of cultural memory, which entails the construction of the
symbolic and historical stability of group identity, in some ways resembles
our current notion of tradition. But the Assmanns and their colleagues shy
away from the metaphor of tradition, arguing that it overemphasizes the
elements of continuity and evolutionary progression.  A vital point that
appears to be frequently slighted by the notion of tradition is memory’s
regressive gesture toward the past.  The memory work of the group consists
in constructing a new image from elements it retrieves from the past.  At the
same time, this gesturing toward the past is deliberately oriented toward the
present.  In using the past selectively, memory retains not the past as such
but in a sense creates a new past that speaks to the needs of the present.  In
sum, memory is conceived less as a storage or archive, and more as a
dynamic operation that reappropriates the past in the interest of communal
identities.  The isolated user who calls up ready-made memories is replaced
by the social interaction of a community within which memories are
produced.  Again, this concept may be relevant for the gospel compositions
if, as will be argued, each gospel constructs a new representation of the
sacred past in order to meet the demands of a changing present.
The contemporary  work on memory can be linked with and greatly
enriched by current media studies.  I refer to the classic contributions by
Albert Bates Lord (1960, 1991), Eric A. Havelock (1963, 1978), Walter J.
Ong (1967, 1977, 1982), Jack Goody (1968, 1977), John Miles Foley  (1987,
1990, 1991), and many others.  Orality is speech that actualizes itself in the
act of speaking performances.  To be efficacious oral discourse has to make
audience adjustments; but faced with the risks of forgetting it also needs to
resort to memorable forms and subject matters.  Scribality, on the other
hand, may dodge immediate responsibilities toward hearers.  Due to its
temporal and physical distance from audiences, it can disregard the pressures
hearers put on speakers and the expectations they bring to oral performance.
Owing to this new media constellation, scribality may exercise greater
freedom vis-à-vis both audience/readership and tradition.  Scribality, being
more loosely dependent on audiences than orality, may thus not merely
reinforce identities groups hold of themselves but effectively reshape them.
In a classic article Ong (1977:53-81) has described this phenomenon as the
fictionalizing of the writer’s audience.  Insofar as writers construct in their
imagination a readership cast in certain roles, readers in turn are expected to
relive the roles in which they are cast “which seldom coincide[s] with . . .
[their] role[s] in the rest of actual life” (61).  Likewise, scribality’s
disengagement from oral tradition may produce precisely the kind of
alienation that will prove productive for creative reassessments of tradition
in ways primary oral cultures cannot ordinarily tolerate (ibid.:17-49).
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Scribally effected memory, therefore, may develop new possibilities
of reappropriating the past and engender thought in new ways.  Especially in
times of radical change and disaster, when prevailing paradigms have lost all
persuasive powers, the medium of scribality is entirely suitable for
undertaking a productive retrieval of the past so as to point a way out of the
crisis.  The textualization of a tradition is therefore by no means a guarantor
of stability and continuity.  In the case of the gospels one needs to take into
account the medium of scribal technology and the potential it harbors for
reshaping tradition.  To be sure, scribality, due to its storing function,
appears to have solved the problem of forgetting, but its scribally enforced
distance from hearers may facilitate innovative thought and in a sense bring
about an intensified form of forgetfulness.2
In view of the interest presently being devoted to various aspects of
memory in the humanistic and social sciences, one cannot escape the
impression that mnemosyne has been promoted to virtually paradigmatic
significance.  In its most general sense, the rediscovery of memory induces
us to reconsider basic premises of the ancient and medieval manuscript
culture.  Memory, memorial processes, and their interfacing with social
realities, expectations, and identities suggest that extratextual thought
processes cannot be excluded from the composition of the gospel
manuscripts.3  Our concept of the scribal culture that produced the gospel
texts should not, therefore, be confined to textuality, intertextuality, written
sources, and source dependencies without consideration of the memorial
operations that are implied in the gospels’ diverse reappropriations of the
past.  It is in this sense that the current work on memory will be integrated
into our reflections on the gospel compositions.
Concepts of Tradition
When we turn our attention to New Testament scholarship, we
observe that memory and memory studies—with one exception—play an
insignificant role in the contemporary scholarly apperception of the
canonical gospels.  In most quarters of the scholarly guild mnemosyne
simply is not a relevant issue.  I see no, or next to no, serious influence of
                                          
2 “Das kulturelle Gedächtnis . . . birgt Risiken des Vergessens und
Verschwindens, Veraltens und Verstaubens, die der mündlichen Überlieferung fremd
sind, und bedeutet eher Bruch als Kontinuität” (J. Assmann 1992:101).
3 Excluded from consideration are manuscripts that are the result of simple
copying techniques and practices.
THE CASE OF THE GOSPELS: MEMORY’S DESIRE 59
the memorial work being done in the humanistic and social sciences over the
last half-century.  Nor have the by now classic studies on orality and
textuality produced over the past five decades by Lord, Havelock, Ong,
Goody, Foley, and others made any appreciable impact on New Testament
studies.  Deeply grounded in our humanistic legacy and profoundly
insightful about the implications of the communications media, these
studies, if applied judiciously and knowledgeably, could prove beneficial for
the health of biblical studies.
To the extent that a discourse on memory has taken place at all in
New Testament scholarship, it has been decisively shaped by Birger
Gerhardsson.  His monumental work, aptly entitled Memory and Manuscript
(1961), will remain an unsurpassed classic of biblical studies in the twentieth
century.  The book developed a model of early Christian traditioning
processes on the analogy of rabbinic Judaism of the Tannaitic and Amoraic
period, dated roughly from the catastrophe of 70 CE to the fifth century.  In
Gerhardsson’s view, memorization was practiced both in the Pharisaic,
rabbinic school tradition and in early Christianity as a mechanical
commitment of materials to memory by way of continual repetition.  In the
Christian tradition, the carriers were primarily authority figures, with Jesus
himself as the inaugurating authority, and the twelve apostles as the first and
crucial link in the chain of tradition.  Changes that did occur in the
traditioning processes were confined to interpretive adaptations.  On the
whole, tradition was, therefore, characterized by fixity, stability, and
continuity, and the primary purpose of transmission was the deliberate act of
communicating information for its own sake, without serious regard for
matters of interpretation and application.  As a result, the tradition never
radically altered sayings of and stories about Jesus.  Based on the assumed
model of Pharisaic, rabbinic transmission techniques, the synoptic materials,
cast in memorable modes of communication, were repeated many times
over, until they arrived, more or less intact, in the narrative gospels.4
It is worth observing that the first and virtually only time in modern
biblical scholarship that memory is introduced as a key concept into the
study of Christian origins, it is presented as cold memory, highlighting its
retentive function and reducing it to strictly preservative purposes.  One may
ask whether projecting memory as the grand stabilizing agent reflects the
                                          
4 In subsequent publications Gerhardsson has minimally modified his thesis,
making small concessions both to changes in the processes of the tradition and to the
gospels’ autonomous narrative identities vis-à-vis tradition.  By and large, however, he
has adhered to the thesis of a virtually unbroken continuity of tradition from Jesus into
the gospels.
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anxieties of modernity and its historical consciousness that seeks to
safeguard the factual reliability of the gospels.
Critics of Gerhardsson’s erudite work have frequently observed a
precarious backdating of rabbinic pedagogics into the period before the
conflagration of the second temple.  Undoubtedly, the watershed
significance of 70 CE both for Jewish and for Christian hermeneutics is
difficult to overrate.  Backdating was also the major issue raised by Jacob
Neusner (1972) in one of the harshest pieces of criticism directed against
memory and manuscript.  However, we need to mention here that Neusner
has recently “recanted” and in a dramatic gesture of intellectual repentance
endorsed the new edition of Memory and Manuscript (Gerhardsson 1998).
With the greatest respect for Neusner’s unparalleled knowledge of rabbinics,
I remain unconvinced that memorization—if indeed it was the prevailing
method of rabbinic transmission in the first century of the common
era—serves as the appropriate mode for early synoptic transmission
processes.
While the rabbinic tradition enjoyed a distinct appreciation for the
accuracy of the transmission, its written legacy does not entirely support the
idea of accuracy as the sole determinant of traditioning.  The Mishnah is
characterized by a multitude of traditions and a variability of certain themes.
To be sure, it does not concede the same interpretive space to each theme
and tradition.  As a rule, halakig exegesis tends to be more stable than the
haggadic one.  But the overall impression provided by Mishnaic texts is that
single entities of the tradition are revised and provided with glosses,
expanded as well as shortened.  Is all this the result of the textualization of
oral traditions, or do we not gain some insight here into what oral
composition in performance might have been like?
That many dominical sayings in the synoptic tradition are
mnemonically shaped so as to acoustically effect an oral and, we should add,
visual apperception among hearers is self-evident.  But we distance
ourselves from the assumption that mnemonics eo ipso entail memorization.
That information is couched in mnemonically usable patterns is a
commonplace of ancient and medieval rhetorical conventions.  Customarily,
mnemonics operate in the interest of assisting memory and of facilitating
remembering in the oral processing of knowledge and information.  They
allow for, indeed thrive on, hermeneutical inventiveness and compositional
freedom in performance.  Memorization, by contrast, enforces the
inculcation of words through ceaseless repetition, and displays little interest
in accommodation to social contexts and live audiences.  The issue raised by
Gerhardsson comes down to the question of whether early Christian
memorial culture transpired as passive transmission under the aegis of cold
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memory, or as hot memory, propelled by active remembering and
socialization.
Perhaps the difficult issue of tradition can be further illuminated from
the larger perspective of Jewish-Christian hermeneutics.  Both in rabbinics
and in Christianity a similar concept emerged that became virtually
canonical as far as the comprehension and status of their respective
traditions were concerned.  In early Christianity the idea emerged that the
disciples/apostles had been appointed to be eyewitnesses of Jesus’ life, from
baptism to resurrection, and were therefore both destined and qualified to
function as reliable guarantors of the tradition.  In the rabbinic tradition
scribal scholars between 80 and 200 CE generated the theory that Moses had
transmitted a depository of revelatory words that were meant to supplement
the Torah; they were handed down, more or less intact, all the way into the
rabbinic present.  The rabbinic thesis resembles the Christian postulate, and
both originated at a moment in Jewish-Christian post-war history when the
two faiths were in dire need of self-legitimation.  At this point in history
both Judaism and Christianity grew self-conscious about the tradition as
tradition by anchoring it in the sacred origin and by further securing it via
the thesis of an unbroken continuity.  In both instances, tradition, or all
subsequent remembrance of tradition, is, so to speak, canonized.  In other
words, the myth of tradition tells us how tradition as a whole was
remembered.  It deserves to be appreciated as the core element of the
tradition’s receptionist history, and must not be used as a starting point, let
alone core element, for the reconstruction of the historical processes of the
tradition.
More recently, Rainer Riesner has contributed a major work that in
many ways is indebted to and carries forward Gerhardsson’s pioneering
study.  In Jesus als Lehrer (1984) Riesner, not unlike Gerhardssson, argues
that Jesus practiced the method of memorization and systematic repetition to
make sure that his hearers preserved his message intact.  Moreover,
following his teaching activity in Galilee and in view of steadily increasing
threats to his life, Jesus, according to Riesner, confined himself to the circle
of the twelve and imparted esoteric information to them.  This development
enabled the circle of the twelve to function as “guarantors of the continuity
of tradition.”5  Mnemonically shaped sayings, deliberate teaching
                                          
5 Riesner 1984:485: “Selbst wenn eine Funktion des Zwölferkreises als Garanten
der Traditionskontinuität von Jesus nicht beabsichtigt gewesen sein sollte, so erfüllte die
Gruppe doch faktisch diese Aufgabe.”
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summaries, esoteric teaching, and frequent repetitions created favorable
conditions for “a reliable post-Easter transmission of the logia materials.”6
As far as the esoteric feature is concerned, it needs to be pointed out
that Jesus’ retreat to the circle of the twelve constitutes a narrative element
that is intricately linked with other narrative features and must not, therefore,
tempt us to draw far-reaching historical conclusions.  Caution is all the more
called for since the Nag Hammadi gospels have demonstrated that esoteric
teaching can be a genre indicator.  This points up a basic problem in the
work of Riesner as well as in that of Gerhardsson.  They move uncritically
from issues of genre and narrative to history, or, to be more precise, they fail
to explore sufficiently the genre indicators and narrative dynamics of the
gospels.  They have not, that is, made the well-known turn to language,
rhetoric, and narrative that has distinguished much of the work in the
humanities during the last century.
In summarizing the work of Gerhardsson and Riesner with a view
toward memory, it is striking that the concept has been reduced strictly to its
retentive, reproductive, and preservative function.  Tradition functions in
what essentially are iterative operations that emanate without noteworthy
alterations into the pleroma of the gospel narratives.  In other words,
memory acts as the stalwart of stability, safeguarding an unchanging
tradition and thus guaranteeing the historical reliability of the gospels.  For
this is what seems to matter most: overcoming historical skepticism.7  It is
possible that the highly restrictive concept of memory made fashionable by
Gerhardsson and Riesner has contributed to the repression of a discourse on
the broader and more dynamic role of memory in gospel studies.  This is
regrettable because “memory and manuscript” remain key issues for our
understanding of the composition processes leading up to the gospels, and, I
should think, of the formation of early Christian texts more widely.
It would seem to be a matter of some importance that neither
Gerhardsson nor Riesner has undertaken an in-depth analysis of the gospels’
sayings materials, the most valuable piece of evidence available as far as the
synoptic tradition is concerned.  With regard to our understanding of the
nature and operation of the pre-gospel tradition, their work does not move us
beyond that of Rudolf Bultmann, whose 1921 publication of The History of
                                          
6 Ibid.:430: “Bereits dadurch waren gute Voraussetzungen für eine zuverlässige
nachösterliche Tradierung des Logienstoffes geschaffen.”
7 Ibid.:502: “Sollte auch der in der vorliegenden Arbeit nur skizzierte
nachösterliche Verlauf des Überlieferungsprozesses in den Grundzügen zutreffen, so
kann die historische Skepsis der ‘klassischen’ Formgeschichte überwunden werden.”
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the Synoptic Tradition had marked an earlier twentieth-century landmark in
biblical studies (see Bultmann 1995, Theissen and Vielhauer 1971).
In this classic work, Bultmann examined such excruciatingly difficult
issues as the oral tradition assumed to have preceded gospel textuality, that
tradition’s component particles, the laws of oral transmission, and the
relation between tradition and gospel.  For the first time in modern biblical
scholarship the synoptic sayings and stories were subjected to a
thoroughgoing examination.  The author’s principal argument stated that
tradition lay in the background of the written gospels, that it was largely oral
in character, and that the gospels were deeply implicated in this oral matrix.
In the most general terms, the case he made was based on the observation
that many of the individual component parts of the gospel
narratives—different types of sayings and miniature stories—carried the
hallmarks of oral composition and performance.  When isolated from their
involvement in the gospel’s mega-narrative, these individual units were
analyzable, their original form reconstructable, and their performance in
particular social settings imaginable.  By examining a myriad of data and by
recreating the developmental pattern of oral processes, Bultmann sought to
write a history of the oral synoptic tradition preceding the narrative gospels.
Whatever else his work accomplished, it seemed to have demonstrated that
the gospels were the products of a history of the transmission of oral
traditions, rather than a direct transcription of the events surrounding Jesus’
life and death.  The gospels were nourished by, at least partially composed
of, and above all intelligible as reservoirs of tradition.
Bultmann’s project was informed by a trinity of theoretical principles:
the original form of oral units, the dominance of directional growth
processes, and the intrinsic causality of the tradition.  First, the simplest form
of a unit was usually taken to be the original form, constituting a basis for
observing secondary developments.  Second, the dominant trend, generally,
was assumed to have been from purity and simplicity toward complexity,
manifesting a quasi-evolutionary ascent of oral tradition culminating in the
narrative gospels.  Third, as far as the motivating forces of oral transmission
were concerned, it was assumed that tradition itself exerted pressures toward
ever more comprehensive manifestations.  Propelled by their own gravity,
the multiple pre-gospel springs, streams, and rivers had little choice but to
flow into the reservoir of the gospel narrative.
This model of the tradition’s evolutionary ascent from simplicity to
complexity, propelled by the law of intrinsic causation, suggests a thought
pattern so utterly persuasive to the human imagination, so conveniently
logical (not to say intellectually seductive), and so deeply comforting and
diagrammatically visualizable that it may seem difficult to imagine any other
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mode of tradition.  And yet, Bultmann’s model is burdened with significant
problems stemming from a lack of understanding of orality, gospel
narrativity, and, last but not least, memory.
First, there is no such thing as “the original form” in oral speech.
When the charismatic speaker pronounced a saying at one place and
subsequently chose to deliver it elsewhere, neither he nor his hearers could
have understood this other rendition as a secondhand version of the first one.
And when the second rendition, delivered before a different audience, was at
variance with the first one, neither the speaker nor his audience would have
thought of differentiating between the primary, original wording and its
secondary, derivative version.  Instead, each proclamation was an
autonomous speech act.  There exists, therefore, in oral speech a multiplicity
of original speech acts, or, to use a Heideggerian term, an equiprimordiality8
of multiple speech acts, which suggests a principle entirely different from
and indeed contrary to the notion of the one, original form.
Second, there is no spatial directionality inherent in speech.  Words
spoken are not spatial phenomena that lend themselves to representation in
directional patterns.  Speech is bound up with temporality, and therein lies
the greatest difficulty we have in imagining it.  Not only are spoken words
inaccessible to developmental patterns, but they are un-imaginable in any
diagrammatic form or fashion.  Oral tradition is constituted by discrete acts
of speaking, separated by intervals of non-speaking and silence, and partially
retained and resignified in memories—altogether not as items that are
connectable by sequential tracts.  Speech, in other words, does not flow in
this or that direction, nor does it by a law of intrinsic oral causality
irresistibly build up toward textuality.
Third, it is evident that Bultmann cannot attribute constructive powers
and narrative creativity to the final gospel productions.  As he views them,
they are almost entirely the outworkings of tradition.  Mark, generally
considered the oldest of the canonical gospels, merely brings to fruition what
in the tradition had already been well on the way toward the gospel
formation.  Because the gospels are considered the expected summations of
pre-gospel processes, they offer in principle little new information over and
above tradition, and are for this reason unworthy of any attentive narrative
consideration.
                                          
8 Heidegger 1986:131: “Das Phänomen der Gleichursprünglichkeit der
konstitutiven Momente ist in der Ontologie oft missachtet worden zufolge einer
methodisch ungezügelten Tendenz zur Herkunftsnachweisung von allem und jedem aus
einem einfachen ‘Urgrund’.”
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Although Bultmann’s concept of the synoptic tradition is utterly
different from that developed by Gerhardsson, both are ironically agreed in
their depreciation of gospel narrativity.  Neither model manages to account
for and appreciate the gospels’ distinct narrative designs.  If for Bultmann
the gospels as narratives are uninteresting because they represent the
expected outcome of an evolutionary, expanding tradition, for Gerhardsson
the gospels lack innovation because the genetic code of their basic structure
had been inscribed into tradition at its very inception.  And so it happened
that each of the two major models that have been developed in the twentieth
century about the relation between gospel and oral tradition were incapable
of appreciating the literary, poetic autonomy of the synoptic gospels.
Fourth, Bultmann’s monumental scholarly contributions, which span
New Testament texts and their historical environment, hermeneutics, and
theology, display no sustained reflection on memory.  The concept is
without mention in his scholarly work.  This vacuum seems to be related to
his inadequate understanding of both orality and gospel textuality.  The
phenomenon of orality, this irreducibly interlocutionary practice of
communication—including aspects such as speech and performance, orally
patterned discourse and the interaction of aides-mémoire with cognition, the
role of audiences, the somatic components of memory, and remembering
versus memorization—constitutes a syndrome that did not occupy his
scholarly thought.  While he was fully aware of the mnemonic functioning
of many sayings and stories, he never pursued this basic insight in the
direction of what Ong has referred to as “the oral noetic processes”
(1982:64), or what we might call an oral hermeneutics.  His focus was
entirely on determining the original form of a saying or story and its setting
in the life of the community, and not on the rhetorical, performative,
memorial aspects of speech.  As far as the phenomenon of synoptic gospel
textuality was concerned, he could not bring himself to acknowledge
inventive, productive, memorial activity on the level of narrative
construction.  The gospel of John was different because it seemed obviously
shaped by a particular theological idea.  But in the case of the synoptics,
tradition was the creative agent and the gospel its natural outcome.
More than half a century after Bultmann’s history of the synoptic
tradition John D. Crossan published another comprehensive analysis of
dominical sayings.  As far as taxonomic clarity and classificatory exactitude
are concerned, In Fragments (1983) by far eclipses the pioneering studies of
Bultmann, Gerhardsson, and Riesner.  Juxtaposing words and their variant
versions in parallel columns, Crossan provides useful insights into the vast
and variegated scope of the dominical sayings.  However, it needs to be
pointed out that In Fragments is far from being an exhaustive inventory of
66 WERNER H. KELBER
all the available materials.  His study, which is limited to Jesus sayings or
aphorisms in Mark and Q9 and their parallels in Matthew and Luke, as well
as to some extracanonical sources, comprises altogether 113 items.  Three
years later Crossan published Sayings Parallels (1986), a workbook
designed for the study of Jesus’ parables, aphorisms, dialogues (discursive
interactions with interlocutors), and stories (provided they contain sayings).
In addition to the sources previously used, his new work consulted the fourth
gospel, all New Testament texts, fragments of apocryphal gospels, the Nag
Hammadi texts, the Apostolic Fathers, and the early patristic tradition.  The
sum total of sayings accounted for in the Sayings Parallels is 503, more than
four times as many as Crossan had inventoried in In Fragments.  One needs
to get a sense of the vastness of the sayings tradition, all the more so since
Gerhardsson and Riesner, who opted for continuity of tradition and cold
memory, failed to examine the sayings in detail.
What is striking, apart from the sheer quantity of sayings, is the scope
of their variability.  There seem to be no real limits to the plural modes of
modification, mutation, and interpretation.  Abbreviations and expansions,
substitutions and transpositions, in short all kinds of changes are observable.
Now it is self-evident that these observations are made on the basis of
written materials.  This is a matter of some import because the thesis
advocated by Gerhardsson and Riesner views the gospels as the written
repositories of a tradition that was subject to relatively minor changes.
Crossan’s comprehensive analysis of the dominical sayings does not support
this thesis.
From the perspective of media dynamics it is entirely possible that
textuality traffics more freely with the sayings than oral tradition.  As we
observed earlier, scribality’s detached status from direct accountability vis-à-
vis hearers may engender greater compositional productivity.  And yet, one
may ask whether the scribally accessible sayings materials should not look
different if indeed they were rooted in mnemotechnical procedures that were
committed to the principle of verbatim reproduction and retention.  Is it in
fact imaginable that Jesus expounded his message with rote regularity and
pedantic repetitiveness, and without any regard for the diversity of audiences
and circumstances?  If that were the case he would have operated in
violation of one of the basic principles of ancient rhetoric, namely that the
relationship of speaker and hearers inevitably influences what is said and
how it is said.  Is it possible, historically and theologically, to think of Jesus’
                                          
9 The symbol Q stands for a hypothetically reconstructed source (or gospel) of
sayings (or discourses) that may have been used by Matthew and Luke in the composition
of their respective gospels.
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personal proclamation as having reached his hearers in a state of timeless
neutrality and removed from direct existential engagement?  Undoubtedly,
remembering was a crucial concern for speaker and hearers alike, but the
culture of remembering is entirely compatible with active memorial
composition and appropriation, and does not as a rule imply rote
memorization.
The Eclipse of Gospel Narrativity
As we turn from tradition to gospel composition we remember that
Bultmann, Gerhardsson, and Riesner had made little allowance for the
compositional integrity of the gospel narratives.  This exposes a malaise in
biblical studies that points to yet another repression of the dynamic role of
memory.
Long before Bultmann, Gerhardsson, and Riesner, the gospels as
narratives have been the cause of great difficulties for interpreters.  While
narrative has proven to be fertile ground for theoretical issues such as
fictionalizing versus factuality, revealing versus concealing, content versus
form, foundationalism versus revisionism, story versus discourse, myth
versus history, and so forth, the immanent world of the gospels has—until
recently—remained strangely inaccessible.  Despite intense scholarly
attention to the gospels, the history of gospel scholarship over the last 250
years could be negatively judged as an escape from narrativity.
In a noted book entitled The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative (1974),
Hans Frei has documented with painstaking precision the inability of
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century biblical scholarship to capture the
narrative shape and logic of the gospels.  This loss of narrative
comprehension, the so-called eclipse, occurred because priority was given
not to narrative itself, but to what narrative was assumed to be referencing.
Whether biblical narrative was considered to have been constructed
on the logic of history, in which case narrative significance was equated with
external events, or whether it was seen to be encapsulated in ideas and
ethical counsel, meaning was in each case held to be separable from the
narrative plot.  In one instance, narrative pointed to what was assumed to
matter above all else, namely the history of the narrative’s subject matter,
while in the other case narrative was understood to refer to what was
theologically superior, namely ideas.  In each instance, what was assumed to
be the essential core was extrapolated from what was downgraded to an
inessential frame, and the result was a loss of narrative reading.  One failed
to grasp the narrative realism and to take narrative seriously not merely as a
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clue to historical and ideational references, but as a literary entity in its own
right.
Frei chose to interpret historical and ideational referentiality with a
very broad compass.  In principle, any reading of narrative that prioritized a
narrative-neutral world above, beneath, or in front of the biblical narrative
was suspect, whether that world was constituted by “historical events, the
general consciousness or form of life of an era, a system of ideas, the
author’s intention, the inward moral experience of individuals, the structure
of human existence, or some combination of them” (1974:278).  What he
objected to was a reading that subordinated the narrative configuration to its
assumed subject matter—whatever that may be.
In bemoaning the loss of narrative reading and in invoking the ideal of
the narratological sensus literalis of the gospels, Frei appeared to champion
what in the Anglo-American literary world came to be called the New
Criticism, a rigorous type of formalist aesthetics that insisted on the
autonomous, internally unified organism of the text as the bearer of
meaning.  Notably, however, Frei’s professed intellectual sympathies did not
lie with Cleanth Brooks, Robert Penn Warren, W.K. Wimsatt, and other
representative advocates and practitioners of the New Criticism, but rather
with Derridean deconstructionism.  At least as he came to view his eclipse of
biblical narrative ex post facto, it appeared that he intended to expose what
in postmodern terminology would be called the logocentric passion of
biblical studies.  Logocentrism, this deep-rooted desire to attribute
transcendental significance to the referents of language, be they historical or
ideational, was at fault for distracting attention away from the narrative
signifiers toward assumed signifieds, the alleged carriers of full presence.
Because Derridean deconstructionism had refocused attention to the internal
play of signifiers, and was therefore treating narrative with greater respect
than either historical or phenomenological hermeneutics, Frei, when pushed
for his own intellectual identity, would be inclined to side with Derrida: “It
is this displacement or divestment of a signified world into the intertextuality
of an indefinite sequence of signifiers—a focal insistence of the
Deconstructionists—that is so apt in their critique of phenomenological
hermeneutics” (1986:56).  Frei’s project concerning the rehabilitation of
narrative was not, therefore, an outgrowth of the New Criticism and its often
observed resemblance to classical Christian theology, which, it is said,
endowed the sacred text with the stature of a complete and authoritative
presence of meaning, embodying a literary correspondence to the dogma of
Jesus Christ, the Son of God, incarnated as divine Word.  Rather, what Frei
was up against was the eclipse of biblical narrative that, he seemed to
suggest, was effected by a logocentric thirst for ideational purity or factual
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correctness, a striving after underived origin, which in its desire to abstract
ideas or historicity from the assumed narrative frame was compelled to view
a strictly narrative reading of the gospels as superficial or simply
wrongheaded.
It may be said, therefore, that Frei’s intellectual endeavor, which
documented the history and rationality of the eclipse of biblical narrative
more than it illuminated the nature of narrative itself, exposed, willingly or
unwillingly, a theological complicity with the eclipse of biblical narrative.
Theological rationalists and superrationalists alike aspired to divest the text
of its narrative “framework” in order to retrieve its quintessential reality.  All
tended to view form as an impediment to epiphany.
Even though Frei did not, as far as I can see, lean on classical
antiquity or medieval hermeneutics and their considered treatment of the
linguistic sign (Manetti 1993; Eco and Marmo 1989), it may be claimed that
his study exposed the implications of the signs’ character of language as the
underlying linguistic, philosophical, and theological crux with regard to the
interpretation of biblical narrative.  Exemplarily formulated by Augustine,
the theory states that all words, written and spoken, refer to or signify
corresponding realities; words “merely intimate that we should look for
realities; they do not present them to us for our knowledge.”10  Deeply
entrenched in the ancient linguistic method of knowing, the Augustinian
signs theory had it within its powers to induce readers and interpreters of the
gospels to focus less on narratives themselves and more on what they were
assumed to be referring to.  Conceivably, Frei’s project to deconstruct
referentiality shows a closer affinity to Derrida’s relentlessly elaborate
deconstruction of his beloved North African compatriot’s signs theory than
to the Christian romanticism of the New Critics.
We have seen that the eclipse of biblical narrative, which Frei had
documented through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, extended
deeply into the twentieth century.  Whether one approached the gospels from
the perspective of form criticism11 (Bultmann), or from a view opposing
form criticism (Gerhardsson), or with an interest in and equipped with the
tools of historical criticism (Riesner), understanding of the interior
consistency of narrative reality was almost always lacking.  It appeared to be
                                          
10 De Magistro  11.36.1-3: hactaenus verba valerunt, quibus ut plurimum tribuam,
admonent tantum, ut quaeramus res, non exhibent, ut norimus.
11 The objective of form criticism is to isolate what presumably were orally
operating sayings and stories from their gospel contexts, to locate their function in early
Christian communal settings, and to reconstruct a history of the transmission of oral
traditions.
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exceedingly difficult to come to terms with the notion that the gospels’
narrative emplotments did not merely illustrate or point to meaning but
constituted meaning in their entirety.  The eclipse of biblical, and especially
gospel, narrative was regularly accompanied by a loss of memorial
sensibilities.  For if one views the gospels primarily as an outgrowth of
tradition, or as carrier of history, and if one focuses meaning on underlying
ideas or history, one will never come to appreciate the gospels’ literarily
plotted configurations, which are to a considerable extent, as we shall see,
the result of socially engaged and productive memorial activities.
The Typographic Captivity
There is every indication that the eclipse of gospel narrative and its
accompanying loss of memorial sensibilities had become institutionalized in
biblical studies.  While it is true, as we shall see below, that greater
appreciation for the narrative nature of the gospels has recently been
developed in gospel studies, the discipline remains beholden to basic
heuristic tools and models without which we cannot imagine the scholarly
work of gospel studies, and which are profoundly insensitive to memory as a
productive arbiter in the composition of the gospel narratives.
For the most part biblical studies are being conducted as a fiercely
text-centered discipline.  This is a commonplace given the fact that the
Bible, including its compositional and receptionist histories, is constituted as
a textual enterprise of staggering proportions.  But as far as the very concept
of text is concerned, we are laboring under a cultural discrepancy that
separates the ancient media world from modernity’s communications
culture.  On the one hand, biblical texts without exception came into
existence as chirographically produced papyri, scrolls, and codices.  Modern
biblical scholarship, on the other hand, is a child of the typographic age.
The typographic technology deeply affected both interpretations of and
attitudes toward the Bible.  On the one hand, the print Bible, the first major
mechanically standardized book of early modernity, helped pave the way for
humanistic and ultimately historical-critical scholarship and its fixation on
original intent and individualized authorship.  On the other hand, the printed
text’s systematic orderliness, which “effectively reified the word” (Ong
1982:119), pointed toward categorical literalism, culminating in Protestant
fundamentalism—a modern, not an ancient or medieval phenomenon
(Kelber 1999).  Modern biblical studies largely learned its basic trade on the
technologically transformed print Bible.  As a consequence, a typographic
consciousness has deeply penetrated biblical studies, and an ingrained print
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mentality has shaped basic assumptions, methods, and even theories—a
development that has proven hostile toward gospel narrativity and memorial
practices.
The so-called Two-Source Hypothesis can conveniently be used to
demonstrate the point.  Since the middle of the nineteenth century, this
hypothesis has become a fundamental explanatory model in gospel
scholarship.  It is widely, although not universally, accepted as the most
plausible theory that accounts for the interrelationship among the synoptic
gospels of Mark, Matthew, and Luke.  Because these three synoptic gospels
are remarkably similar, to the point of exhibiting verbatim versions, but also
remarkably different as far as the existent wording, themes, and
arrangements are concerned, scholars have assumed some kind of
interrelationship among the three.  What in scholarship is known as the
Synoptic Problem concerns issues such as the compositional priority of one
of the synoptics, and the literary interrelationship among all three.  It is one
of those problems in the humanities that appears ever more puzzling and
virtually irresolvable the more deeply one looks into the textual evidence.
The Two-Source Hypothesis argues that Matthew and Luke independently
used Mark as their basic narrative source, to which they added teaching
materials drawn from a second, hypothetically reconstructed document
known as Q, which consisted largely of Jesus sayings.
It would be difficult to consult an introduction to the New Testament
that does not display the theory in diagrammatic fashion, displaying the view
that Matthew and Luke each used two sources, Mark and Q, in the
composition of their respective gospels.  To account for Matthean and Lukan
materials not covered by Mark and Q, one often resorts to additional sources
labeled SM and SL respectively, thus in effect postulating a Four-Source
Hypothesis.  The assumed connections between gospels and other gospels or
literary sources are represented in straight lines, displaying an unwavering
directionality and finality.  In their full implementation these diagrammatic
models attribute the texts of Matthew and Luke in their entirety to literary
sources, thereby conveying the impression that the composers of these
gospel texts are intelligible largely as ingenious jugglers of sources, and that
their compositions result from the combination of other texts.  There is no
room in this model for orality, for memorial processes, for social
engagement, for mental compositional activities, and for extratextual
sensibilities of any kind.
The problematic nature of this model has not escaped the attention of
some observers.  Willi Marxsen, who took the lead in the modern
rediscovery of the gospels’ narrative emplotment, articulated an entirely
appropriate criticism vis-à-vis the Two-Source Hypothesis (1968:116):
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We also need to note that the Two-Source theory looks at the connections
between Mk. and the other Synoptics merely from the angle of literary
dependence.  But we now know that in their writing Matthew and Luke
were influenced by definite theological concepts, which often resulted in a
very independent treatment of their models.
While it is widely conceded that Matthew and Luke use their sources
flexibly, even creatively, the explanatory model for Matthean and Lukan
compositions nonetheless relies exclusively on literary sources.  One would
never guess, from pondering these diagrams, that Matthew and Luke
represent autosemantic narrative constructions whose inventive center of
composition lies outside their respective literary sources.  But when we
claim here that the explanatory model of the Two-Source Hypothesis does
not take Matthew’s and Luke’s active treatment of their sources into
account, are we not then conceding that it fails to represent crucial
compositional activities, and hence is inadequate at best and seriously
misleading at most?
The second example concerns the so-called gospel parallels, a
universally popular teaching and research tool that lines up the synoptic
gospels (and John) in parallel fashion, allowing students to undertake
critically comparative studies.  Few paradigms have more deeply impacted
our habits of thought than this systematic organization of gospel texts into
parallel columns.  In laying out the gospels into tidy columns one next to the
other, study habits that nurture a growing conviction that a gospel text is
comprehensible largely or exclusively in relation to other gospel texts have
been internalized, and a mental image of a closed textual system of gospel
relations has been canonized.  Texts are made to operate in a textual
universe, deriving from and feeding into new texts, hence finding their
raison d’être in an exclusively textual universe.  So deeply engrafted in our
mindset is this model that we need reminding of the artificiality of this
arrangement, which is designed to feed our analytical needs but in no way
corresponds to the oral and chirographic dynamics of the ancient
marketplace of communications.  But if absolutely basic research models
and teaching tools are as seriously flawed as we claim they are, what does
that mean for gospel scholarship and its results?
In further exemplifying the consequential typographic bias, I shall
briefly digress into a different medium.  I will reflect on an oil painting,
produced by a Valentin de Boulogne and dated around 1600.  The painting
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represents the apostle Paul and is entitled “Saint Paul Writing his Epistles.”12
The apostle is sitting at a desk, dipping his quill into an inkwell.  He is
surrounded by books, manuscripts, and a notebook, all of which he appears
to consult in composing his letter.  Produced approximately 150 years after
the invention of printing and the publication of the Gutenberg Bible, the
painting’s dominant impression is one of the omnipresence of texts.  At a
time when the duplicating effects of the print medium had dramatically
increased the availability of texts, it seemed entirely unimaginable that Paul
could have composed his letters without ample recourse to texts.
The only concession to ancient scribality is a scroll in the right corner
of the table.  But the overwhelming impression the painting conveys is that
of Paul as textual scholar, who reads, compares, and reflects on different
texts—one of them being a printed text (presumably the Hebrew Bible)—in
order to compose his own text.  This is how the typographic imagination of
the late sixteenth century, a thoroughly literary, text-centered imagination,
conceived of the composition of the Pauline letters: texts, even letters, grow
out of other texts.
Under the impact of this artistic imagination it requires a strenuous act
of historical imagination to recall that the Paul of the first century did not
write but dictated his letters, that all his writings, including the most intricate
theological arguments in Galatians and Romans, were mentally composed,
and that large segments of his arguments are structured according to the
conventions of Jewish-Hellenistic rhetoric.  The painting has succeeded in
displacing Paul’s oral, rhetorical, scribal culture with the exclusively
literary, textual, typographical culture of the sixteenth to seventeenth
century, and it did so around the same time that rhetoric was eliminated from
the curriculum of most European universities.
We may look upon this painting as a metaphor for the kind of cultural
displacement I see happening in biblical studies, and also, I should like to
add, in parts of classical and medieval studies.  The two explanatory and
research models I have submitted for discussion exhibit not simply the issue
of intertextuality (Clayton and Rothstein 1991; Buchanan 1994; Genette
1982; Culler 1975)—a commonplace in literary criticism that expresses
awareness of the fact that texts cannot be created simply out of lived
experience.  The crux of these models is that they represent
diagrammatically constructed closed worlds, systems within which every
item of the tradition has been assigned its due place.  This is no longer
ancient or medieval intertextuality, which always recognized interfaces and
                                          
12 I could easily have selected one of many stylized pictures of an evangelist as
writer, but the Pauline example seemed to me even more persuasive.
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permeable boundaries, but modernity’s print mentality with a vengeance, a
mentality that locks all items into typographic space, relentlessly strives after
finality, totality even, and seems oblivious to worlds outside its boundaries.
Together these two models confine the gospels and their sources to a tightly
configured textual space that leaves little room for particular narrative
formations and no room for memorial activity.
The Poetics of Gospel Narrativity
It was only during the last four decades that some biblical scholars
began to approach the gospels with the kind of literary-narratological
singlemindedness that Hans Frei had envisioned (Wilder 1964; Petersen
1978; Rhoads 1982; Rhoads and Michie 1982; Poland 1985; Moore 1989;
Fowler 1991).  The most significant outcome of these efforts has been the
recovery of separate Markan, Matthean, Lukan, and Johannine literary
identities.  At this point, the literary exploration has progressed far enough
that we can speak of the narrative poetics of a Mark, Matthew, Luke, or
John.  It is now clearly demonstrable that distinctive narrative points of view
are mediated by thematic, rhetorical, and literary devices such as the
particular arrangements of episodes, distinct plot causalities, the casting and
typecasting of characters, framing devices of various kinds, ring
compositions and intercalations, strategies of misunderstanding and role
reversals, multiple forms of redundancies, pointedly executed polemics,
topological-geographical configurations, and so forth.  Many, although by
no means all, aspects of the gospels show evidence of intended selectivity,
valuation, and composition.  It is, therefore, increasingly apparent that each
gospel is the result of a deliberate compositional volition and a distinctly
focused rhetorical outreach.  In other words, a growing number of biblical
scholars have come to the realization that each canonical gospel is composed
with an individual literary integrity.
Once we are cognizant of the plotted nature of the gospels, we can no
longer attribute the sole motivating agency for the gospel narratives to the
forces of tradition.  Bultmann’s assumption that the gospels in their entirety
are the outworking of tradition has now become untenable.13  Indeed, once
                                          
13 Bultmann’s basic assumptions about the gospels have been continued in our
generation by Helmut Koester.  For him Mark “was more of a collector than an author”
(1990:286) or, as he put it elsewhere, Mark was “primarily a faithful collector” (289).  He
appears to have overlooked at least four decades of fruitful work on the narrative nature
of Mark.
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we make allowance for the gospels’ narrative intentionality, e.g., their ability
to score dramatic points, to channel discernible values, and to dramatize
corrective views, the paradigm of source theories as the basic rationale for
gospel compositions loses a good deal of its explanatory value.  This is not,
of course, to deny the shaping influence of pre-gospel traditions, including
so-called sources.  But the weight of tradition notwithstanding, in the last
analysis it is the final compositional volition that shaped tradition, and not
vice versa.
Nor will recognition of the plotted nature of the gospels henceforth
permit us to honor the prevalent convention of privileging ideas over their
narrative elaboration, and of separating content from form.  Because in
narrative meaning is constituted by narrative, a conscientious narrative
appreciation will refrain from abstracting theological ideas from their
narrative enlistment.  For example, as far as the gospels are concerned, there
is, strictly speaking, no so-called christology apart from narrative, because
the protagonist comes to life, acquires identity, pursues his focused career,
and submits to execution within the coordinates of a narrative world, which
is composed of the interfacing of all the words and incidents that make up
the narrative.
This is not to say that the gospels are fully plotted narratives in the
sense of a detective story in which every single detail turns out to be crucial.
Story has a history, and the gospel narratives are in large part episodic with
many elements not fully under authorial control.  Nor do we endorse a
narrative poetics that is synonymous with full narrative closure.
Undeniably, the gospels are compositions with deep diachronic roots in oral
and written traditions.  From the perspective of both production and of
consumption, they open out to realities outside their narrative boundaries.
They are, we shall see, informed by issues that are current in their respective
communal settings and therefore deliberately audience-oriented.  The point,
however, is that there are overarching thematic plot constructions that have a
way of subsuming the episodes into a semblance of narrative unity.
By way of example, let us see what a narrative interpretation of the
classic theological concept of eschatology may look like.  To begin with,
one may view narrative as the genre that is exceptionally fitted to mediate
the human experience of temporality and to constitute time-consciousness
(Ricoeur 1984-88).  The gospels, like all narratives, explore miscellaneous
potentials for configuring temporality and indulge in fictional experiments
with time.  Instead of extrapolating the theological idea of eschatology from
its narrative implications, we will trace temporality through its narrative
engagement.
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What is immediately evident in reading the gospels is an unequal
distribution of time.  The narrator controls the tempo of time, speeding up
the story of the protagonist’s life through a rapid succession of episodes
quickened by the staccato rhythm of strong, swift temporal beats, and
slowing time down in the death story, whose narrative length seems out of
proportion to the narrated few days.  The effect of the decelerating narrative
tempo is an intensification of the solemnity of the last days.14
As far as the narration of eschatology is concerned, the apocalyptic
speech of Mark 13 offers insight into a dramatic reinvention of time.
Notably, the speech “disrupts” the narrative sequence precisely at the
neuralgic point that gave rise to the aporia of time, namely the destruction of
the sacred center.  Strategically placed at the peak of an elaborate anti-
temple narrative build-up that culminates in the protagonist’s prediction of
the destruction of the temple, the discourse is constructed to respond to the
temple disaster and the crisis it has engendered.  It deviates from the story
line of Jesus’ life because the severity of the crisis calls for novel temporal
modalities that appear not fully explicable via the narrative mechanism that
mediates the protagonist’s own time.
Rupturing the narrative mediation of the protagonist’s life, the speech
conjures the specter of wars and rumors of wars, of conflict among political
kingdoms, of earthquakes, famines, and persecution.  Here the protagonist’s
voice more emphatically than in other discourses is the narrator’s, speaking
above the heads of the listening disciples and addressing the readers of the
gospel (13:14: “Let the reader understand”).  The central event around which
the speech is constructed is signified as “the desolating sacrilege” (13:14), a
metaphor that summons the reader to search for clues in the informing
context of Daniel.  Yet physical destruction is not what is said to account for
the extremity of the crisis and the depth of grief.  The crux of tribulation is
that it disconfirms a time that had been pregnant with signs and omens, and
crowded with prophets and Christs.  Saturated with promises and full of
expectations, it was perceived to be eschatological prime time, messianic
time, the kairos.  But contrary to dreams and expectations, all signs of full
time were consumed in the conflagration of war and in the horrors of flight,
in killings and homelessness.  And so, full time is shown to have been lost
time, not simply in the sense of having been a time of destruction, or time
deleted and abolished, or simply time past, but in the sense of having been a
                                          
14 A narrative assessment of the passion narrative will, therefore, conclude that the
obvious discrepancy that exists between the episodic life story of Jesus and the more
coherently flowing story of his death may be due to a narrative rationale more than to
sources.  See Kelber 1976.
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time misunderstood and misconstrued.  Deconstructing full time, the speech
also denounces the presumptions of the present, and discredits all claims to a
metaphysics of present, viewing the presence as a blessing in disguise at best
and time of absence at worst.  Extricating kairos from the ruins of a
misconstrued history, full time, if it is to be had at all, is projected into the
future.  Time lost is the thing to be gained.  In an almost Proustian sense,
redemption is the regaining of lost time.
 The readers of Mark’s gospel are advised to integrate this specific
temporal reconceptualization with the gospel’s fuller narrative mediation of
time, and to synchronize all narrative configurations of time with their own
time.  In particular, they need to connect the crisis of time and its narrated
resolution in Mark 13 with Jesus’ announcement of the kairos and the
speech’s anticipation of full time in the future (13:24-26).  This
comprehensive synchronization of the narrative’s temporal emplotment,
including the aporia of time, with the readers’ time would appear to position
both the crisis of time and the readers’ time in an interim period framed by
the fullness of the kairos in Jesus’ past and the future coming of the Son of
Man.  This is what a reading of the gospel that has undertaken the shift from
the classic theological concept of eschatology to an informed appreciation of
the narrative construction of temporality may look like.
Memorial Arbitration
To grasp the full implications of the poetics of gospel narrativity, we
need to recognize that all four narratives take up and address topics that are
live issues in tradition and/or in their respective communal settings.  For
example, Mark unambiguously endorses the tradition concerning Jesus’
resurrection, yet chooses to withhold a resurrection appearance story both
from the disciples in the narrative and from the readers of the narrative
(16:1-8).  He is clearly aware of the traditional theme of Jesus’ resurrection
appearance legitimating apostolic authority, but he chooses to dissociate
himself (and his readers) from it.  This is an example illustrating that
narrative’s deep engagement with and deconstructive attitude toward
tradition.  Luke is known for his inclination to further enhance pro-Roman
proclivities that are already in evidence in Mark.  For example, three times
the Roman procurator Pontius Pilate announces Jesus’ innocence (Lk 23:4,
14, 22).  Clearly, the narrative shows keen awareness of and strives to
negotiate a rapprochement with the political realities of the Roman Empire.
The gospel of John dramatizes a rivalry between Peter and the Beloved
Disciple, the latter, carrying the unqualified blessing of the narrator, ever so
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often surpassing Peter.  It suggests a prior and informed knowledge of a
Petrine type of tradition that, from the narrator’s viewpoint, is in tension
with his own religious and communal identity, represented by the Beloved
Disciples.  Matthew, finally, to cite one of the more notorious examples,
wages an unmitigated polemic against the Pharisees.  This—by far the most
Jewish gospel, counseling not merely Torah observance but Torah
radicalization à la Qumran—is also the one gospel that makes anti-
Pharisaism a deliberate narrative theme.  There is a broad-based scholarly
consensus that Matthew’s narrative mirrors the post-70 CE conflict between
a Pharisaic, rabbinic type of Judaism and Matthew’s dissident, messianic
Judaism.  The debate between these two representatives of Judaism will
have reached a new level of intensity in the aftermath of the colossal
catastrophe of the temple’s conflagration.  This event forced a debate both in
Judaism and among the followers of Jesus with a view toward the future of
post-70 CE Judaism.  In this context, the gospel’s vituperative language is
designed to delegitimate a Pharisaically guided Judaism, and to carve out
and sanction the social and religious identity of Matthew’s messianic
Judaism.  Within a short time, Matthew lost the battle for Judaism.  These
examples, which can easily be multiplied, demonstrate the gospels’ agility in
critically and creatively molding their narratives as they appropriate and
respond to issues that are live concerns both in their respective communal
settings and in the larger Greco-Roman-Jewish historical environment.
From this particular insight into gospel narration, let us now probe the
issues of gospel versus tradition, gospel composition, gospel
interrelationships, and stable versus dynamic memorial processes—all issues
that are at the heart of this essay.  Once we have taken full cognizance of the
compositional artistry and respective narrative autonomy of each canonical
gospel, we are bound to acknowledge that gospel parallels and source
diagrams are at best formalistic propositions that beg, indeed cover up, vital
questions about the nature of the gospels.
When we consider, first, that there is a deliberate and creative
imagination at work in the formation of the gospels that gives them distinct
narrative profiles; and when, second, we observe the gospels’ plural
implications in traditions both past and present, and in voices and themes
that far exceed one or two identifiable literary sources; and when, third, we
pay particular attention to the gospels’ polemical postures, which are as a
rule ad hoc constructions more than products of simple word-by-word
rewritings of sources, must we not inevitably come to the conclusion that
there cannot be a single unified field theory capable of explaining gospel
compositions and gospel relations entirely in terms of literary relations,
literary dependencies, and copying processes?  Must we not think
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then—quite apart from, or in addition to, or perhaps over and above literary
sources—of a cultural matrix other than literary sources, of, for example, a
memorial arbitration that retrieved and reproduced, selected and adapted
tradition with a view toward one’s own present?
With this question we return to our introductory review of current
studies on memory and imagination ranging from Carruthers and Coleman
all the way to Halbwachs and the Assmanns.  While the modern scholar is
brought up on the inviolate authority of texts and their relation to other texts,
many ancient and medieval writers were more interested in the dynamics of
reception and internalization.  Both processes of composition and reading
aloud were frequently described through metaphors of digestive activity
(Carruthers 1990:164-69,192-94).  Memory inter alia served the purpose of
producing texts by way of composition, and of making it one’s own by way
of consumption.  One of memory’s deepest mysteries was its unfathomably
immense capacity for storage.  In the tenth book of his Confessions
Augustine offers a sustained meditation on memory, going into rapture over
this “large and boundless chamber,” replete with “numberless secret and
inexpressible windings,”  “the plains and caves and caverns, innumerable
and innumerably full of innumerable kinds of things.”15  But when
Augustine and the ancients praised memory, they were thinking not solely of
the memorial powers of retrieval, memory’s retentive, preservative, and
iterative faculties.  The proof of a superior memory lay also in its ability to
mentally collect and store the items, to scan all stored materials, to call them
up in their mental locations, to move them about and to reshuffle them.  In
the technical nomenclature of rhetoric, mnemonic storage existed in the
interest of inventio, namely, the collecting and arranging of materials for the
purpose of composing both speeches and texts.
To think of the gospels as ultimately works of productive memorial
processes is to cultivate extratextual sensitivities, and to think of a cultural
tissue at once more copious and more elusive than our linear perception of
literary sources will allow.  Consideration of the inventive role of memory
suggests a judicious plugging into the web of cultural memory, retaining,
collating, and adapting traditional items, reclaiming and citing some,
responding critically and even deconstructively to others, while
recontextualizing many so as to make them serviceable to the present.  Last
but not least, the model of productive memory also assigns forgetfulness its
appropriate place.  For forgetfulness, far from being an insignificant
                                          
15 Confessiones 10.8.15: penetrale amplum et infinitum; 10.8.13: qui secreti atque
ineffabiles sinus eius; 10.17.26: campis et antris at cavernis innumerabilibus atque
innumerabiliter plenis innumerabilium rerum.
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appendix to tradition, is an essential correlate of remembering.  In bringing
the gospel narrative to present remembrance, its compositional processes are
bound to function selectively, consigning to oblivion some memories while
foregrounding others.
The deepest impulse driving the memorial composition of the gospels
is the retrieval of the past for the benefit of the present.  Transmission for the
sake of preservation is not the only, or even most important, function of
memory.  Rather than aspiring to preserve the precious past as past, the
cultural memory that we see operating in the formation of the gospels
proceeds from the perspectives of the present because it seeks to legitimate
the past as present.  By drawing on the past from the perspective of the
present, one retains not the past itself, but a recreated new past that
accomodates present circumstances.  In the words of Jan Assmann that serve
as the epigraph to this piece: “In der Erinnerung wird Vergangenheit
rekonstruiert.”
This is why the gospel narratives as cultural memories always reflect
the condition of their production.  Selection, organization, and composition
of materials are informed not predominantly by responsibility vis-à-vis the
past, but more by ethical, communicative, and rhetorical accountability
toward the present.  And if this seems an exaggerated view, let us modify the
wording by claiming that the gospels as memorial compositions seek to
maintain an impossibly precarious balance between a simultaneous
responsibility toward the past and toward the present, with a view as well
toward the future.  But what matters most in the literary-memorial
composition of the gospels, I would insist, is not the preservation of tradition
per se, but rather the maintenance of tradition for the purpose of shaping and
preserving group identity.
Significantly impacted by the disaster of 70 CE, the gospel narrators
regressed into tradition’s sacred past.  They remembered the beginnings of
the renewal movement, focusing on the life and death of the unforgettable
charismatic, and they did so in narrative form that accounted for and
provided guidance under new and difficult circumstances.  Viewed from this
perspective, the gospels are neither the products of stable mnemonics, nor
the result of strictly intra-gospel scribality, but symptoms of the selective
functioning of scribal and memorial processes.
Epilogue:  The Dilemma of Memory and Manuscript
In the thousands of pages I have read on the so-called Synoptic
Problem, rarely ever is the issue of the materiality of communication taken
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into account.  It is simply taken for granted that the issue is a literary one
that is susceptible to an exclusively literary solution.  And yet no theory of
the gospels’ literary nature and composition will ever be valid unless it is
imaginable in terms of ancient media realities that are by no means
exhausted in literary terms.  How can one imagine—technically, scribally,
orally, memorially, compositionally—a scribal authority plugging into
multiple social, ideational, and historical matrices, while at the same time
engaging in near-verbatim copying of some texts (in the case of Matthew
and Luke at least), while all the while engaging in a fairly focused
compositional activity?
Technically, the production of many ancient and medieval
manuscripts was the result of a division of labor.  Often a scribal expert in
charge of the chirographic production wrote from dictation.  He had little or
no authority over the formulation of the text.  That was the business of the
dictator.  Since simple scribal copying will fall short of an explanation for
the gospel compositions, may we conceive of a process of mental
composition, and of the dictator as the intellectual, imaginative locus from
which the gospels unfolded?  In other words, can one imagine the dictator
mentally in control of texts to the point of verbatim remembering, and
versed as well in multiple traditions, themes, and social networkings, and
also able to reshape written and unwritten traditions with a view toward both
the present and the future?  Or should one think of a process of composition
in the process of writing, and view both the scribe and scribality as the locus
of inventive production?  Here we have reached the limits of how we can
presently envision the nature and composition of the gospels.  But this much
does seem clear to me: memory and manuscript are the twin categories that
are critical for our understanding of the gospels and their narrative
compositions.  Deeper knowledge of the dynamic interfacing of memory and
manuscript would bring us closer to finding a resolution to the intricate
issues that lie at the heart of the Synoptic Problem.
Rice University
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